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ADDRESSES

suggested that it make a study of our judicial system, generally, but,
unfortunately, the committee has not functioned. I recommend that
a new committee be appointed by the incoming President, with one
member from each judicial district, to make such study and to report
its findings to this Bar at its next annual meeting, and I further
recommend that this meeting authorize the Board of Commissioners
to take such action on adoption of the Canons of Judicial Ethics as
it shall deem advisable, after study of the matter.
Ladies and gentlemen of The Wyoming Bar, with this meeting
my official connection with this organization will terminate but my
unofficial interest in it and its affairs never will. My personal conviction is that we face many new and perplexing problems in this
turbulent and revolutionary time in which we are living, but I am
confident that this Association will fearlessly confront and deal with
those problems as they arise in our state. We are few in numbers
but by working in unison we can be an even more potent force than
we are now. Let us courageously face the future, resolved to preserve
our American way of life, and determined to elevate our profession
and benefit mankind.

THE PROPER PLACE AND FUNCTION OF THE
LAWYER IN SOCIETY-SOME REFLECTIONS
ERNEST WILKERSON*
Nearly one hundred years ago, an Englishman determined to
write a book. He wanted to set down lucidly and compellingly the
principles which guided his life, and to dispel, as well as one man
could, the half truths and the prejudices which he felt impeded a
tolerant understanding of his beliefs. He undertook the task prayerfully, and wrote with the clarity and discernment which is achieved
only by those who are determined to assemble words in a manner
which will reach the hearts of men. He wrote with an inner compulsion to say what he believed to be true and what he believed needed
saying. The result was a message, which, in its realm, is a masterpiece. The man was John Henry, Cardinal Newman; the book,
Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Any one who reads the work and lays aside
his preconceptions of dogma and dialectics acknowledges the genuiness
and worth of Newman's efforts. The significant thing is not whether
one adheres to Newman's creed; what is significant is that here was
a man who had a deep-rooted belief in the meaning of his life and
works and could explain it in comprehensible terms to his fellow men.
Newman, it happens, was a practitioner of religion. He could
equally well have been a practitioner of medicine, of farming, or of
*
Of Casper, Wyoming; member of the Wyoming State Bar. This paper won
for Mr. Wilkerson the 1949 Ross Essay Prize, in the contest conducted by
the American Bar Association.
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law. In every profession, in every craft, and in even the most humble
pursuits, there are men who believe in what they are doing and believe
that what they are doing is important. A very few try to tell why;
the majority do not. The latter may have the best of it. The few
who are given to analysis of their place in the societal framework will
feel inevitably the hopelessness which comes from trying to evaluate
their work and daily activities in terms of the somewhat nebulous
ideals which motivate them. It is disturbing to try to mesh the two,
because to do so we must take our eyes off the shoulders of the man
ahead and stand for a moment outside the line of march, trying to
view the entire parade as one integrated, meaningful display. Being
only man, we never do this with complete success.
A lawyer who is bent on writing about his place and function in
society steers a perilous course. He begins-and midway finds that
he has outlined a comprehensive and boresome treatise which might
appropriatelybe taught as "The Legal Profession-one credit hour."
He begins again- and finds himself fathering a compendium of legal
miscellany, setting down "How" and "What" in an edifying way, but
forgetting to say "Why." Or he may struggle through a Hegelian
quagmire for a few thousandwords before he discovers that the "Why"
-the philosophy of the law-can be translated only in terms of the
"How" and "What" of the lawyer's everyday routine. To strike a
balance here is difficult. It is especially important that we not take
too olympian a point of view, for the practicing lawyer, after all, is
a fellow who has to sell himself and his wares to his non-lawyer
neighbors, in order that he and his family may enjoy a measure of
the same opportunities and comforts as they. It is true that what
he has to sell is different from what they have. The skill of the surgeon is essentially a mechanical one, as is that of the bricklayer.
Either the incision is deep enough or it is not; the building will either
stand or fall. The lawyer's skill might be said to consist in his ability
to transmute certain metaphysical concepts into practical and realistic
guides for action and conduct. The "reasonable man" cannot be
measured with calipers; the "holder in due course" does not come in
a pattern; and "good custom and usage in the trade" cannot be
weighed on the scales.
As lawyers, we deal with intangibles which we must make sensible
to ourselves and to our clients through the highly imperfect medium
of words. It is in this regard that the lawyer finds himself in sympathy with the minister. Both are trying to interpret and instill
rules of conduct; rules which derive, in the one case, from the deliberation and councils of men, and in the other, from sources outside ourselves. The lawyer has a slightly firmer grip on reality here, for he
can predict with somewhat more certitude what rewards or punishments will follow a given course of action. Consequently, he may not
be so susceptible to soul-searching doubts as to whether or not he is
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right. Be that as it may, it is not only ministers, not only the Newman's who should feel called upon to give an occasional accounting;
lawyers, being members of perhaps one of the most maligned professions, should feel a particular impulse to reason out their place and
function in society.
There is something rather wholesome in occasional introspective
probings to see what makes us what we are and whether what we
are is what we should be. Improvement is often born of inquiry.
True, in so analyzing ourselves, we may fall gracelessly between two
stools. We, in the legal profession, know our professional Jeromiahs,
whose discourses intone our mea culpea and who assure us that in the
brighter world to come there will be no place for higgling, niggling
likes of us, and we are not completely unfamiliar with those at the
other extreme whose mothers presumably were frightened by the
Coue formula. Most of us would acknowledge that somewhere between the two poles, there lies a true analysis of what it is we lawyers
have to offer to humanity that makes us worth our keep. What is it?
What do we do? We do not heal the sick or build the buildings; we
do not shoes the horses or pilot the planes; we do not ride the high
wires or compose the songs. What do we do? Well, for one thingWe distinguish the cases.
"Why may not that be the skull of a lawyer?
Where be his quiddities now, his quidlets,
his cases, his tenures, and his tricks?"
Hamlet, Act V, Scene I
Daily we lawyers are forced, often without our being conscious
of it, to make nice analyses of fact situations and to compare them
with this or that legal pattern. We deal with a mechanism, the law,
which is not unlike the child's toy which has a number of dissimilar
apertures which will receive from the grubby hands of our little ones
only blocks of the same shape and dimension, and which we bring
home with the belief that it may teach perception of the like and unlike
to the child. We hope that eventually he may learn that a circular
hole will not receive a square block. So it is with us, when we try to
find the aperture to fit the problem which concerns us.
A popular song of a few years back assured us that "Everything's
been done before," but we begin to wonder in the law, particularly as
we try to find what the law is in the case at hand. Often as our research progresses, we discover that the cases which made the law
what it is are somehow different from our own. So we distinguish
the cases and so we strike out to make the law of our case what we
think it should be. This seems a prosaic enough exercise, and one
which possibly does not deserve mention among all of the splendid
and inspirational aspects of the profession. On closer analysis,
though, there seems to be a significant principle behind "distinguish-
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ing the cases" which we, as lawyers, should recognize and should
carry forward for the benefit of our people and our society. Today
one of the most dangerous of tendencies is the failure critically to
analyze and to differentiate between things which may look, sound,
and seem like other things, but which are really very different. It
may be that only as we preserve our ability to distinguish and to
perceive differences and similarities, can we hope to exist and mature
as a civilized people.
In this time there is constant danger that we, who have the
democratic right to do so, will not weigh and assay truly the genuine
and the meretricious as it pours in on us from all sides. Through our
phenomenal advances in science and communication, we have taken
the problems of the whole world out of the chancellery and the
G.H.Q. and pitched them into the front parlor and the corner drugstore. To have done so is a magnificent accomplishment, but one
which is fraught with the inquiry, "Do we as a free people have the
understanding and the insight to make the right decisions if we are
given the truth?" Do we have the ability to "distinguish the cases?"
Only as we do, will we know why foreign "isms" of whatever kind are
not the answer for our people. Only as we do, will we know that out
of the history and characteristics of every people is woven the pattern
for its existence and survival. Only as we do, will we understand
that because there are no cases "on all four's" in the realm of the
struggle and achievements of whole peoples, there is no blanket
panacea for their ills, no universal Baedeker for their economic,
political and spiritual wanderings.
We lawyers know that even in the elemental realm of the relationship of one individual to another or of one individual to his state,
we never find the ready-made answer. We know that in the infinite
variety of human relationships through the centuries, there have
never been two instances where the identical factors produced the
identical results for the identical reasons. This is why we distinquish
the cases, and this is why we know that it is important to do so. We
should say to our lay friends, "Criticize us if you will for our quibbling
and picayune ways, but never forget that it is only as we Americans
differentiate the good and bad, false and true, Christ and anti-Christ
that we may hope to escape the terror of barbaric despotism." This
needs to be pointed out early, often, and with emphasis. Maybe the
lawyers, because they believe it and practice it, should be the ones
to be sure that it is. And this may well be one of the reasons whyWe go into politics.
"The profession of law is the only aristocratic element
which can be amalgamated without violence into the natural
elements of democracy and which can be advantageously
and permanently combined with them."
De Tocqueville, Democracy in America,,
Vol. I, Chapter XVI
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It is no accident that lawyers have been foremen in the construction of the great backdrop of government, before which has been
played the drama of our democracy. The inherent promise of a free
society is that man has the innate ability and integrity to judge public
problems in their true light and to come to wise and timely decisions.
This premise is fundamental in the operation of our legal system
as well.
One of the aspects of our jurisprudence which has been subjected to the most severe academic criticism is our adversary system
of procedure. Would it not be better, some say, that there might be
a calm and dispassionate appraisal by disinterested persons, followed
by a decision rendered in an aura of sweet reasonableness, rather than
having a hammer and tong battle between special pleaders, given to
excess in statement and overeagerness in forwarding their viewpoints? It is these observers (who deplore the pugnacious processes
of the law) who are most surprised to see adversary attorneys "have
at each other" for an hour and then link arms and walk away together.
It is in that very phenomenon that there lies a meaningful kernel of
significance, not only for lawyers, but for all of our people.
This nation is not a homogeneous mass of faceless people; it is
a surging, colorful pattern of individuals, each of whom has the
innate and basic human dignity recognized by our constitution and
not one of whom may be scorned, oppressed, imprisoned or punished
without the awareness and appraisal of the whole of the people.
Having, thus, a nation of strong men and women who are led by
stronger leaders, we do not lack for divergence of interests or opinions.
Today the men of labor, the farmers, the industrialists have equally
influential and capable spokesmen. These spokesmen forward with
telling advocacy the special interests of their supporters for the consideration of the whole people, who, in a democracy, are the final
court of appeal. There is apparent, thus, a close and interesting
parallel between the processes of the law and the processes of government. The analogy, oversimplified, might be stated thus: in both
realms, from a free interplay of excesses and biased viewpoints, we
attempt to construct a fair, balanced and equitable solution. There
are probably better ways of arriving at truth, but until we are blessed
with a revelation as to what they are, we will have to continue to
hammer out with our imperfect and brittle tools codes of conduct and
ethics which we deem wise and just. We do not, as yet, receive
predictable divine guidance in our activities in this regard, so we
have to do the best we, as human beings, can do.
Thus in our society and the law carried on, and thus do we try
to attain in both that precarious balance which we define as the
greatest good for the greatest number. It is probably because lawyers
are weaned, so to speak, on the principles that every man is entitled
to his day in court, that every man should be heard, that there are
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two sides to any question, and that equally honest, wise, and Godfearing men can hold diametrically opposed views on any given matter,
that they find themselves so inevitably drawn from the practice of
law into the larger arena of the practice of political science. Simply
stated, the goal of both mechanisms, the law and the government,
should be to compound, out of the facts truthfully stated and a comprehension of man's essential possibilities and limitations, a solution
which is fair and workable. The lawyer, trained in the gentle and
difficult art of compromise and negotiation, finds himself no stranger
to the same processes as they are found in government. The lawyer,
who pins his faith on "twelve good men and true" to reach the right
answer in his case, will most likely be one to resist those who challenge
the ability of these twelve men to think for themselves in society.
The lawyer, who knows the intensity of effort required to prepare and
plead his client's case can comprehend the sincerity of those whose
views differ from his own. The law mirrors on its small surface the
whole intricate pattern of the political system, and thus does the
lawyer, initiated into the delicate mysteries of human action, reaction
and interaction in his own profession, gravitate naturally into the
larger game of politics.
We regard the equities.
"Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances."
Tennyson, "Alymer's Field"
There is an elemental concept which underlies the Anglo-Saxon
approach to the law-Fairness. What is the fair decision between
two contesting parties or between groups of millions of citizens with
disparate interests? It was this need for fairness which impelled
us to introduce the great concept of equity into our legal system. We
thereby induced a flexibility and humanity which immeasurably
strengthened the system.
In all of society, we have a continuing need for the same sort
of tolerant understanding of the wants and needs of various of our
peoples. The dangers to our form of government do not arise out of
the creation of a responsible state which will and can adapt itself
with fluidity to changing social patterns and human needs. The
dangers lie rather in the creation of an unbending and steel-jacketed
series of concepts which are used with fine impartiality to thwart
the just and the unjust and to block the needed changes along with
the crack-pot scheme. The great architects of our democratic structure have had the same qualities as the great lawyers and judges of
our legal system. Both have realized that laws and political mechanisms spring from the minds of men and that neither must be so deified
as to become an instrument of oppression for one or for one million
of our people. In the history of the human race, when a political
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philosophy or a legal system has been allowed to atrophy to the point
where fairness, which is another way of saying equity, is not its basic
end, then the people have thrown it off, and through turmoil and
bloodshed have brought forth another system which they believed fair.
We lawyers, nurtured as we are in the importance of precedent,
must, of course, give respectful and mature consideration to what
has been said by other men in other times. We must find there, if
we can, the decision in our case, in order that we may serve the end
of predictability in the law, but we must,-and here we will surely
play false to ourselves and those we speak for if we do not-have the
courage and the innate and indestructable faith in ourselves to discard
those precepts, these precedents, if they are outworn, and ourselves
blaze a new trail if need be to assure that fairness will lie at the end
of our labors. If we do this in our profession for our clients, can we
do less as citizens when we detect an oppressive and unjust economic
or political situation?
We in America are engaged in a great continuing defiance of
history. All the manifold chapters of men's courageous effort to
mold and direct his political and economic destiny have closed with
a sorry postlude of despotism, disillusion and despair. It has ever
been the lot of men to create governmental machines, which, though
nobly conceived, eventually toppled because of their inflexible and
immutable processes which failed to change as human wants and
needs changed. When this has happened, a Khan, a Caesar, a Bonaparte, or a Hitler has always been ready to lay the scourge of dictatorial oppression on the individual citizen because he had failed to keep
his government fair and free. Is it not particularly necessary that
we have men and women in our state and society in whom the concept
of "looking at the equities" is ingrained? It was by looking at the
equities that we lawyers tempered the rigidity and the harshness of
the common law centuries ago, and thereby saved it from certain
destruction at the hands of the people who created it but who could
no longer be sure of being treated fairly under it. Oppression in law
is merely a small counterpart of oppression in society. Equity in
law should and must find its greater counterpart in equity in society.
Lawyers, who know best the vital and irreplaceable part equity
plays in law, must be sure that so long as they can be heard, equity
will have its place in our government and in the thinking of our people.
But mainly we practice law.
"The popular attitude toward the legal profession, never
particularly favorable, has recently grown even more cynical.
The general futility of litigation has given rise to the view
that the principal benefit derived from a law suit is that the
controversy is ended, rather than that justice is done . . .
Despite this, there is a public respect for the mental versatility and ability of the bar. Its genius for getting results,
and its peculiar facility for tackling and untangling complex
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situations are almost summed up in the popular assumption
that a lawyer can do anything, although the process is expensive."
A. A. Berle, Jr., writing in
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,
Vol. IX, Page 344, "Legal Profession and Legal Education."
Not too long ago there was a uniformity of interest and activity
among our lawyers. In the days when the gangling Abe Lincoln
rode circuit, the lawyer of New York would have felt at home in North
Carolina, and a young aspirant "reading law" in Maine could, with
equal ease, have packed his bindle to Massachusetts or Missouri. In
retrospect, there seems a pleasant simplicity about those days. The
unqualified edicts of Blackstone make our present writers seem a lot
of nambly-pambies, and the ferver and colorful phraseology which
our predecessors used in "pleading their cases" make our current
court room work drab by comparison.
Tastes, of course, have changed. Today we are motivated by
inquiry and skepticism. None of our judges or writers is safe from
the "legal realists" and as for "pleading the case," we are all so wary
of appearing unsophisticated that we hesitate to invoke the fiery
phrase and purple passage (which may be all to the good).
All of which is by way of saying that the practice of the law,
like most other things, is not what it once was. Today, the attorney
who is administering a railroad in receivership is practicing law as
much as is the attorney replevying a horse. The fact is that "the
law" has grown into such a tremendous factor in all our lives that
there is no one and no thing unaffected and unmotivated by some of
its ramifications. The reason for this is simple-laws are created
by men to govern their relationships and contacts with each other. As
those relationships and contacts become more numerous, complex,
and subtle, so must the laws. As the laws become more numerous,
complex, and subtle, we observe a splintering of the practice of the
law into specialties. Today's lawyer who would be a general practitioner must make up his mind that he will never equal the skill of
the legal specialist in the specialist's field. The other side of this
coin, of course, is that the legal specialist must resign himself to the
fact that he will never have the broad ability to compose a solution
to his problems by using the full scale of concepts and ideas which
the general practitioner draws on.
One of the results of our creation of this tremendous and intricately contrived code of legal conduct has been the formation of
the great law firms of the nation, whose numerous members process
a legal problem in much the same fashion that Ford makes a motor
car. This is an expensive proposition, and perforce the client who
can afford this sort of thing is not the ribbon clerk, but the corporation
which manufactures the ribbon. This is something we should scrut-
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inize carefully. Legal services, because they explore and adjudicate
rights and moral responsibilities, cannot always be sold to the highest

bidder, as can a case of toothpaste. In ratio as our profession allows
itself to become the handmaiden of "bigness," it will surely undermine the foundation on which it rests-the consent and good will
of the whole people. We lawyers have erred in this direction in the
past. We may be eternally grateful, however, that we have had
individual lawyers, and law firms as well, with discernment, who
have realized the great and peculiar responsibilities laid on them,
and who have given their utmost in behalf of the "millions who,
humble and nameless, the straight, hard pathway plod."
There has been no perceptible clamor in America for "socializing
the lawyer." We may, in all candor, compliment ourselves on this,
because the conclusion we may draw from it is that in one hundred
fifty years of free practice of law in America there have not been
many who have been turned back without representation, not many
who, because they lacked funds, lacked a friend in court or a word
of counsel. This situation, let us hope, will continue. We lawyers
must not evaluate our efforts or those of our colleagues in terms of
how much money we make and keep; rather, our respect and affection
must be saved for those lawyers and law firms who are on the firing
line day in and day out, bringing justice and understanding to those
of our people who are in trouble, doubt, and distress.
There are two fine old designations for members of our profession
which regretably have very largely passed into disuse. They are
''counsellor at law" and "advocate." These names have significance
because of their being descriptive. Taken together, they pretty well
sum up the dual aspect of our profession and provide a handy, thumbnail description of what our job is.
To be a counsellor of one's friends and neighbors in the multifarious problems that confront them is a great responsibility. At
times, it seems these days that life's carrousel turns so fast that we
no longer hear the music and enjoy the ride, but must use all of our
strength just to keep from being pitched off. Today there is the
inevitable cultural lag in the mental and spiritual adaptation by our
people to their accelerated material and scientific culture. Our people
are, consequently, uneasy and unsure at times. They need the counsel
of honest men whose principles are rooted in fundamental truths. It
does not matter whether these men be lawyers or doctors or bartenders.
So long as they have inherent good sense and a steady belief in basic
principles, they are eligible. In our own field, counseling is a process
we should foster and encourage. It is, in a sense, "preventative law."
We should try to make our clients understand that they can get help
from us more effectively and more cheaply before they are in trouble,
before the contract is broken, or the wheel flies off. This is the place
of the gounsellor at law. Whether we call ourselves lawyers, attorneys,
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barristers, or what-have-you, let us train and equip ourselves to
counsel, for therein lies the greatest opportunity to hold our fellow
men to a steady course amidst the distractions and confusions of today.
Finally--something about our place as "advocates." In the epic
volumes of man's history, the most bitter and fruitless pages have
been those in which the mass of mankind wanted, needed, but failed
to find advocates to fan into flame the sparks of inspiration and
grandeur which smoldered among the people. The greatest, most
noble achievements of man have resulted because of the presence of
advocates; not, assuredly, because they were artificers who could
formulate philosophies and doctrines and impose them upon the
people, but rather because they could phrase and render tangible the
yearnings and aspirations of the people and could present them in
a fashion which the people recognized as their own creation. Thus
was created the Magna Carta, thus arose the great protestant religions, and thus was born our own Declaration of Independence and
Constitution. These achievements are advocacy on a grand scale. We
should not let their heroic dimensions blind us to the fact that the
identical intellectual and spiritual processes created them as create
our pleas for justice, compassion and fairness in our daily practice.
If we in the legal profession find through the years to come that
we must relinquish any of our prerogatives, that we are forced to
abandon some of the outposts which we have captured for ourselves
in the economic and social structure, let us defend to the utmost that
great doctrine that every man, every cause, every faith shall receive
adequate and just advocacy at our hands. If we surrender this, we
lose one of the greatest principles on which we have built this nation
-that our people deserve to know all the facts all the time, in order
that they may use their God-given minds and souls to reach the right
deccision.
*
*
*
These things then, among others, comprise the lawyers list of
things to do today and tomorrow. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., shortly
before his death reflected that, "The riders in a race do not stop short
when they reach the goal. There is a little finishing canter before
coming to a standstill. There is time to hear the kind voices of friends
and to say to oneself, 'The work is done.' But just as one says that,
the answer comes, 'The race is over, but the work is never done while
the power to work remains.' The canter that brings you to a standstill need not be only coming to rest. It cannot be while you still live,
for to live is to function. That is all there is to living."
Do the things we have talked about help solve the problem as to
the lawyer's place and function in society? Possibly not, but they do
represent something to work at-something to live for. If we genuinely hold and honestly practice these principles, we will leave a
legacy to those who will follow us of a humane and vital jurisprudence
in a nation which is strong and free.

